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ABLAMIS V. ROPER: PREEMPTION OF THE
NONEMPLOYEE SPOUSE'S COMMUNITY PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN ERISA PENSION PLANS
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress
the power to establish areas of exclusive federal concern and to preempt a
state's authority to legislate in these areas.' To find that Congress has
explicitly or implicitly exercised the power of preemption, courts must find
that Congress had a clear intent to nullify state law. 2 On July 3, 1991, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit provided an answer
to the question whether Congress, in enacting the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 3 intended to preempt state community property law governing a predeceasing nonemployee spouse's interest in an
4
employee spouse's pension plan.
5
In Ablamis v. Roper, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that
ERISA did preempt California community property law that arguably would
allow a predeceasing spouse to devise her interest in her living husband's
pension plans. 6 ERISA grants a divorced nonemployee spouse the right to
receive and dispose of benefits awarded in a divorce proceeding but does

1. U.S. Cotrsir. art. VI, cl. 2; see Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Title
Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (holding that when Congress chooses to legislate pursuant to
its constitutional powers, court must find preemption of conflicting state legislation); Jones v.
Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (stating that when Congress intends to occupy
field of legislation, such as commerce, Congress intends to preempt all state laws regulating
that field); id. at 525-26 (stating that congressional enactments which do not exclude all state
legislation in field may still override conflicting state laws); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 17 (1824) (stating that Supremacy Clause invalidates any state law that is contrary
to laws of Congress).
2. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, Ill S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) (discussing congressional
intent to provide ERISA with broad preemption power).
3. Erhployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1453 (1988)
[hereinafter ERISA].
4. See id. § 1144(a) (stating text of preemption provision). Section 1144(a) states that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title." Id.
5. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
6. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that ERISA
preempts nonemployee spouse's possible property right in employee spouse's pension under
California community property law). The nonemployee spouse and the employee spouse will
be referred to with female and male pronouns, respectively, throughout the Note to prevent
confusion between the case at issue and the general discussion. This is not meant in any way
to perpetuate the stereotype that the woman is the nonemployee spouse in a marriage. The
statutes and case law are gender neutral on their face and as applied, despite the fact Congress
designed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984 primarily to protect women. Id. at 1453-54 (stating that Congress designed
Retirement Equity Act to protect financial interests of women); infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (same).
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not explicitly recognize state-created property rights in a married nonemployee spouse. 7 The court's ruling that ERISA preempts state law creating
rights in such a spouse, therefore, provides a strong incentive for a nonemployee spouse in a community property state to obtain a divorce before
death as the only method of retaining transmissible property rights in the
employee spouse's pension.' This result is contrary to congressional intent
and contrary to state and federal law.
I.

THM PuRPosE AND PROVISIONS OF ERISA

Private pension plans have emerged as an important method by which
workers can provide for financial security in their retirement. 9 However, in
the past the worker was at the mercy of unscrupulous plan administrators
or unfortuitous investments.10 To protect workers and their retirement
savings, Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 to regulate public and private
employee benefit plans." Before the enactment of ERISA, lack of centralized

7. See infra note 18 (stating exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision that allows
division of benefits only if division is pursuant to divorce proceedings); infra note 14 (stating
text of ERISA's anti-alienation provision).
8. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1468 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's
holding will produce incentive to divorce that Congress could not have intended). The dissent
in Ablamis claimed that Congress' policy could not have been to give dying spouses an incentive
to divorce to protect property rights. Id.; see also infra notes 177-95 and accompanying text
(stating that Ablamis result is counter to goals of ERISA and of California property law).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4640 (observing that growth in pension plans parallels transformation of American
society from agrarian dominated to urbanized wage earner economy); Dian T. Arruebarrena,
Applying Louisiana's Community Property Principle to Pensions, 33 Loy. L. REv. 241, 242
(1987) (stating that growth in pension plans is due to favorable tax treatment, union bargaining,
employment incentives, and concern for employee well-being during old age); Edmond Thiede,
The Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in PrivateEmployee Retirement
Benefits, 9 U.S.F. L. REv. 635, 635 (1975) (stating that pension and home are two major
assets of most families); Ellen J. Vargyas, The Retirement Equity Act: Enhanced Rights for
Survivors and Dependents of Pension Recipients, 19 CLEARWGHOUSE REv., May 1985, at 30,
30 (stating that society historically has denied older women access to private pensions despite
pension's major role in theory of economically secure old age).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4641
(citing malfeasance and improper activities by pension administrators, trustees, and fiduciaries
as impetus for increasing federal employee benefits legislation in 1950s and 1960s). Congress
passed ERISA in 1974 because the previous legislation had not sufficiently accomplished
congressional goals of guaranteeing pension benefits for workers and their dependents. Id.
11. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1001(a) (stating that Congress' purpose in enacting
ERISA was providing uniform scheme of pension regulation). As stated in § 1001, Congress
passed ERISA pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Id.; U.S. CONsT. art.
1, § 8. Because benefit plans had grown into a multi-billion dollar industry, Congress felt that
a nationwide and uniform scheme of pension regulation was essential to protect the worker
and to prevent adverse effects on interstate commerce. ERISA, supra note 3, § 1001(a).
Congress, therefore, designed ERISA to be a minimum standard for administration of plans
to safeguard benefits for employees and their dependents as well as to aid the free flow of
commerce. Id. Section 1001(b) provides:
[i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter'to protect interstate commerce
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regulation resulted in financially unstable plans and in lack of uniformity

among state laws governing pensions.' 2 Congress found that this instability
and lack of uniformity deprived employees of anticipated benefits.' 3 As one
way to preserve retirement benefits for employees and their dependents,
Congress included a provision in ERISA that forbids most transfers of the
right to receive benefits.1 4 Federal and state courts, however, were split on
the question whether this bar to the transfer of plan benefits to third parties
applied to the apportionment of benefits to a nonemployee spouse pursuant

to a divorce settlement. 5
Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) as an
16
amendment to ERISA, in part, as a response to this judicial uncertainty.

The REA was Congress' reaction to its perception that under the original
ERISA provisions, some courts' refusal to allow partition of benefits

pursuant to a divorce settlement resulted in unfair treatment of nonemployee

and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
Id. § 1001(b).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4643
(stating that federal law was not adequate to protect employees' pension rights). In enacting
ERISA, Congress' concern was that without adequate federal standards, the employee was
forced to resort to the equitable remedies of the common-law of trusts or some states'
codifications of such principles. Id. Congress proposed ERISA to establish minimum standards
of vesting, funding, and fiduciary duties and to establish a compulsory benefit insurance
program to protect pension benefits. Id. at 4643-46.
13. See id. at 4643 (claiming that, before ERISA, pension participants lost benefits not
because of violation of federal law but because of unfavorable contractual vesting and funding
requirements); supra note 4 (stating that in § 1001(b) Congress' primary goals for ERISA as
solving problems of lack of uniformity and instability).
14. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1056(d)(1) (specifying anti-alienation provision). Section
1056(d)(1) states that "(e)ach pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan
may not be assigned or alienated." Id.
15. See Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(stating that congressional intent clearly was to prevent voluntary or involuntary assignment
or alienation of benefits including in divorce context). But see Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740,
742 (9th'Cir. 1980) (holding that ERISA does not preempt court order requiring pension plan
to pay community property share of benefits to former spouse), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922
(1981); Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that Supreme Court's dismissal of In re Marriage of Carnpa, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) for want
of substantial federal question was decision on merits that ERISA did not prevent application
of California property law), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re Marriage of Campa, 152
Cal. Rptr. 362, 368 (Ct. App. 1979) (stating that state interest of fair division between former
spouses has no bearing on Congress' interest to assure genuine pension rights), appeal dismissed,
444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
16. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) (amending
ERISA §§ 1001-1453). The REA provisions are applicable to plan years beginning after
December 31, 1984. Id.
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spouses. 7 Congress, therefore, specifically authorized a procedure for transfers of benefits in a few situations."8 Congress' goal, in part, was to recognize
the contributions to the family unit made by nonemployed spouses and to
provide a specific exception to the anti-alienation provision for alimony and
child support payments.' 9 Prior to enactment of the REA, some courts had

granted such transfers without express statutory authority.2 Under REA's
procedural requirements, the only acceptable method of transferring the
right to receive benefits is a court order pursuant to a "qualified domestic

relations order" (QDRO). 21 The REA defines a QDRO as a court order
made pursuant to a state domestic relations law, including state community
property law.? With the QDRO exception, Congress now specifically permits
17. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2547, 2564-65 (noting that state and federal courts were inconsistent on whether ERISA
preempted state law allowing attachment of benefits to satisfy family support obligations); id.
at 2547 (stating that goal of REA is to provide for greater equity for workers and their
spouses).
18. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1056(d)(3)(A) (stating exception to ERISA's antialienation provision). Section 1056(d)(3)(A) states that the anti-alienation provision "shall apply
to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a
participant pursuant to a domestic relations order, except that [the anti-alienation provision]
shall not apply if the order is determined to be a qualified domestic relations-order." Id.; see
infra note 21 (defining qualified domestic relations order). Congress added § 1056(d)(3)(A)
section to make a specific exception to § 1056(d)(1). See supra note 14 (stating text of ERISA's
anti-alienation provision § 1056(d)(1)).
19. See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 17, at 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2547
(stating congressional recognition of marriage as partnership and outlining exceptions to
preemption provision). The Senate Committee reported that Congress proposed ERISA in
recognition of the "status of marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial
contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home." Id. The
Committee also specified the exceptions to ERISA's general preemption provision as being
state orders "relating to child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights pursuant
to a state domestic relations law." Id.
20. See supra note 15 (listing cases that are examples of pre-REA judicial refusal to
apply ERISA's anti-alienation provision to division of pension benefits pursuant to divorce
settlement).
21. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1056(d)(3)(B) (defining qualified domestic relations
order). Section 1056(d)(3)(B) states that
the term "qualified domestic relations order" means a domestic relations order
which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns
to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan, and ... relates to the provision of child
support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse,
child, or other dependent of a participant, and is made pursuant to a State domestic
relations law (including a community property law).
Id.
22. Id.; see also S. RaP. No. 575, supranote 17, at 20-21, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2566 (describing meaning of "qualified domestic relations order"). A QDRO creates or
recognizes the existence of another person's right to receive benefits under a pension plan. Id.
A court must make this order pursuant to a state law that relates to the provision of child
support, alimony payments, or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child or
other dependent of a participant. Id. ERISA treats an alternate payee as a beneficiary for all
purposes under the plan. Id.
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a court dissolving a marriage to partition pension benefits in the same
manner as other marital assets. 23 Enactment of REA was not Congress'
recognition of joint ownership, but, rather, Congress' adoption of equitable

distribution concepts into the common-law framework of ERISA.?
II.

THE ORIGIN AND CURRENT STATUS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW

25

Congress based the pre-REA provisions of ERISA on the common-law
'system of property ownership followed by most states. 26 California based
its property law, however, on the very different system of community
property. 27 Community property principles are rooted in the Germanic and
Visigothic law of early Europe. 21 This system gradually spread over the
continent, and eventually the mainland Europeans brought it to colonies

23. See supra note 21 (stating text of § 1056(d)(3)(B) QDRO exception to ERISA's antialienation provision). Section 1056(d)(3)(B) allows transfer of the right to receive benefits in a
divorce settlement if the transfer is made pursuant to state law. Id.
24. See S. REP. No. 575, supra note 17, at 1, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2547
(stating Congress' recognition of marriage as economic partnership and contribution of
nonemployee spouse to family). Congress passed the REA in an attempt to equitably compensate
the nonemployee spouse because states' common law of property traditionally recognizes only
the wage earner's rights in pension benefits. Id.
25. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating Ms. Ablamis died in
1988). The Ablamis court decided the case under California community property law in effect
at the date of Ms. Ablamis' death. But see infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (stating
retroactive abolition of California's terminable interest rule). In 1986 the California legislature
abolished the terminable interest rule, which had prevented the devise of the nonemployee
spouse's interest in pension benefits. Id. A California court of appeals subsequently held that
the abolition was retroactive. Id.
26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (listing nine community property states).
Considering that 41 of 50 states have common-law property systems, it is unsurprising that
Congress designed ERISA to react to common-law mechanisms. Id. Additionally, many of the
ERISA provisions change the common-law property system to include equitable distribution
concepts. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1055 (stating requirement of spousal annuity for
nonemployee spouse); id. § 1056 (stating QDRO exception for division of benefits pursuant
to dissolution of marriage).
27. See W.Lsui
Q. DE FUNAX & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRNcIxs or COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 84-85 (1971) (tracing origins of California property law). Spain established the
community property system in its North American possessions. Id. at 55. When California
entered the Union, the acting governor, General Riley, proclaimed that all laws in California
not inconsistent with the laws and Constitution of the United States would be in force until
changed by legitimate legislative enactments. Id. at 84. During the constitutional convention
held in 1849, a strong debate ensued between those advocating the adoption of the common
law of marital property and those advocating the continuance of the existing community
property system. Id. at 85. The advocates of community property prevailed, but common-law
concepts remained in the mind of legislators and judges. Id. After the convention, the California
courts attempted to interpret and define community property through common-law principles.
Id. at 87. This resulted in conflicting and confusing decisions that required legislative correction.
Id. The present day courts consistently interpret community property free of interference from
common-law principles. Id.
28. See GRACE GANz BLUMBERG, CoMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 1-2 (1987) (outlining Visigothic origins of community property law); FNULMC & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at
39-54 (describing historical development of Spanish property law).
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established in the Western hemisphere. 29 When the Normans invaded England in 1066, however, they had not adopted a community property system
but instead brought with them a feudal system that became the common
law of property.30 Although the common-law system evolved, the concept
of title-based ownership remained basically unchanged. English settlers
brought the common-law system to the North American colonies where,
except as modified by statute, it remains the basis for the laws of most
states.3' All states now have a common-law base for their property law
except for Wisconsin, which adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act in
1984; Louisiana, which adopted the French Civil Law version of Spanish
property law; and seven western states, including California, which adopted
32
variations of the Spanish community property law.
The main objective of the modern community property system is equal
treatment of husband and wife with regard to property rights.33 A community
property system regards marriage as an entity in which husband and wife
are members, equally contributing their labor to the entity and possessing
an equal right to the total wealth of the entity upon divorce or death.4

29. See BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 2 (describing Spanish and French colonization of
North and South America as source of American community property law).
30. Id. See FuNInx & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 4 (discussing origin of common-law
principles).
31. See BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 2 (stating that English common law is source of
most states' property law).
32. Id. The seven western community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Id. The state of California adopted community
property principles by codifying the Spanish property law into its constitution in 1850. Id. at
96; see FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 55-91 (describing origin of community property
in individual community property states). See generally M.R. Kirkwood, HistoricalBackground
and Objectives of the Law of Community Property in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH. L.
Rav. 1 (1936) (discussing development of community property law in Europe and in western
United States); Walter Loewy, The Spanish Community of Acquests and Gains and Its Adoption
and Modification by the State. of California, 1 CAL. L. REv. 32 (1912) (discussing origins of
Spanish property law and its adoption by some states); Michael J. Vaughn, The Policy of
Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20 (1967) (discussing
origin and basic policies of community property law).
33. See FuNtA, & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 2 (stating essential characteristic of
community property is equal ownership and rights in marital property). Community property
law is characterized by: (1) the transmissibility of each spouse's interest to his or her heirs
and devisees and (2) the joint ownership of assets, benefit of gain, and liability for loss. Id.
These characteristics guarantee equal ownership and enjoyment of all property acquired during
the marriage. Id.
34. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 1991) (stating that "[u]pon the death of a
married person, one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse and the
other half belongs to the decedent") and FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 2-3 (stating
that community property concept of marriage is of equal ownership) with 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 441 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 3d ed. 1884)
(stating that nineteenth century English concept of marriage is of ownership of woman by
man). The equality of the California statute is in sharp contrast to the common-law notion
of Blackstone where "by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
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35
Under the common law, ownership rights turn on the existence of title.
Under a community property system, however, the method and timing of

acquisition determines ownership of the property. 36 California law presumes
that all assets and income acquired during marriage, other than property
acquired by gift or inheritance, are community property from the moment
of acquisition, regardless of the division or nature of the labor that produced

them.3 7 Unlike the common law, community property treats the earnings of
each spouse as belonging to both spouses in equal shares. 3 Under California
law, spouses may defeat this presumption only by one member's waiver of
property rights that is in writing, signed, and fully enforceable as a con-

tract.3 9 The presumption of equal ownership is not merely evidentiary or
procedural. Rather, equal ownership is a rule of substantive property law
40
that serves as the base for California's system of property ownership.
Courts, therefore, should not interpret community property law as providing
a windfall benefit for a nonemployee spouse or creating a claim by the

incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." Id. at 441. Clearly, the common
law of property has evolved since Blackstone's time to embrace the traditional community
property notion of recognizing the wife's existence as an independent person. FuNIAx &
VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 5. However, the full recognition of the wife as an equal partner
still separates community property law from common law. Id.; see also WnumAm A. REPPY,
JR. & CYNTmA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (1982) (stating
that in most common-law states surviving spouse has statutory shdre of decedent's estate, but
nonemployee spouse has no testamentary power over assets earned by other spouse).
35. See FUNAK & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing differing nature of property
ownership in community property and common-law systems). In the common-law system,
ownership is dependent on title. Id. In the community property system, title will not defeat
joint ownership if the spouses acquired the property during the marriage by a method other
than gift to one spouse. Id.
36. See id. (describing differences between community property and common-law property
systems). The fundamental difference between community property and common-law property
concepts is best illustrated by examining the distribution of assets when the marital community
dissolves. Upon divorce or the death of one party, a common-law jurisdiction grants the
marital assets to the parties in an equitable settlement where one person gains new rights and
the other loses the rights to specific assets. Id. In a community property jurisdiction, the same
event results in a distribution to each person of the share of the assets that he or she already
owns. Id. There is no transfer of title to assets because the marital relationship provided joint
ownership of all assets. Id.
37. See BLUMBERG, supra note 28, at 6 (stating that community property states presume
property to be held in common ownership unless parties demonstrate otherwise).
38. See FUNiAK & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that all wealth acquired by
husband and wife in community property states is commonly owned property). See also In re
Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641-42 (1976) (stating that joint effort is basis of
community assets, irrespective of individual contribution, and all community assets must be
divided upon divorce).
39. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 142 (West 1991) (stating that spouse is required to sign
waiver to renounce community property interest).
40. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 100 (West 1991) (stating that one-half of community property
belongs to each spouse); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 593 (1979) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (stating importance of state property law and reluctance of courts to find preemption
by federal statute). The Hisquierdo dissent reaffirmed the court's recognition of the substantive
nature of California community property law. Id. at 593.
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nonemployee spouse to property owned by the employee spouse, but, rather,
as recognizing
a substantive property right in both members of the marriage
4
community. '
III.

HISTORY OF PREEMPTION

Despite the substantive and important nature of California's community
property law, Congress can preempt this, or any other state law, by direct

legislative action.4 2 Congress and the courts, however, traditionally have
deferred to state property law because of the strong state interest in

determining the nature of property rights. 43 A state and its political subdivisions have authority to assess taxes, to grant or remove title, and to
determine zoning for the land within their borders. 44 These important powers
allow the state great control over land use. While the Constitution and the
specific mandates of Congress can limit a state's authority over property
rights, Congress should respect state sovereignty and exercise its right of
preemption sparingly. 45

41. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 592-93; see also RmPY & SAMUEL, supra note 34, at 404-05
(commenting that Hisquierdo Court suggests wife is greedy, but court allows husband to use
state law to take one-half of wife's acquisitions while shielding his pension behind federal
requirement that pension is separate property).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of
the Land ... ."); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962) (stating that federal law must prevail
if it conflicts with state law). The Supremacy Clause requires that the Constitution and the
laws passed under it be supreme over any conflicting state law. Id. However, Congress should
exercise this power of preemption carefully, especially when the state law at issue represents
a traditional state concern, because courts will interpret preemption provision without considering state interests. See James A. Riddle, Comment, Preemption of Reconcilable State
Regulation: FederalBenefit Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 HAsTINs L.J. 685,
685 (1983) (asserting that traditional preemption doctrine operates without reference to state
interests at stake or policy considerations behind either federal or state legislation).
43. See Hisquierdo, 493 U.S. at 592-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts
should give great deference to state property law because of strong state interest); Stone v.
Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (stating that courts follow presumption that
Congress did not intend to interfere with state property law because Congress generally avoids
drafting statutes that conflict with any state policy), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (1980), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981).
44. See RicHARD D. BINoHAM ET AL., Tim PoLITrcs OF RAIsING STATE AND LocAL
REvENUE 18 (1978) (stating that states are free to tax except when restrained by United States
Constitution or state constitutions); I JOHN LEwis, LAW OF EMInENT DoAIN § 1 (3rd ed.
1909) (stating that eminent domain is power of sovereign to take property for public use upon
making just compensation); 1 E.C. YoKLEY, ZoNIo LAW AND PRACTICE § 3-2 (4th ed. 1978)
(stating that state or municipality's power to zone arises from inherent police power of state
to meet demands of increase in population and complex commercial relations of citizens).
45. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 493 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (stating that family law
belongs to states and that courts are hesitant to find federal question or that state law is
preempted by federal statute); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) (stating that subject
of domestic relations belongs to states and not to federal government). The Hisquierdo Court
stated that on the occasions when the Supreme Court has found it necessary to prevent injury
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Because of the strong state interest in regulating property rights, a court
should hesitate to interpret a federal statute such as ERISA in a way that
needlessly sweeps away substantive property rights created by the states. 46
Historically, however, courts have interpreted ERISA's preemption provision
broadly by holding that it preempts large areas of state law.4 7 ERISA may
48
be the most sweeping federal preemption statute ever enacted by Congress.
ERISA broadly preempts state law because Congress' primary concern in
enacting ERISA was to require all pension plans to operate under a uniform49
legal scheme and to eliminate the threat of conflicting state regulation.
Because Congress intended to place regulation of pension plans beyond the
reach of state laws, courts have honored that intent by preventing states
from entering this area of exclusive federal concern.50

to a federal right by a state community property law, the conflict, as in Hisquierdo, concerned
federal and state rules for the allocation of a federal entitlement. Hisquierdo, 493 U.S. at 582;
see also McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981) (holding that military pension is
not subject to division because federal pension program preempts community property law);
Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950) (same).
46. See FumAX & VAuGHN, supra note 27, at 8 (arguing that community property law
should be respected as substantive state interest). Funiak & Vaughn state:
The community property system is as legitimately the law of some of our states as
the common law principles of marital property are in others. If ours is a government
of laws and not of men, as has so often been said, the community property laws
of certain states are entitled to as much respect and consideration as any other laws
and are as much entitled to the protection of the United States Constitution as are
any other laws. They have been the law of some of our states for well over a
hundred years and if they bring any advantages to those living under them, such
advantages are legitimately theirs by virtue of law and they are entitled to be
protected in them.
Id.
47. See Ingersol-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478, 482 (1990) (stating that
Congress' use of expansive language indicates intention that courts construe ERISA preemption

provision broadly); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983) (stating comprehensive nature of ERISA); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 552-53 (6th

Cir. 1987) (stating Supreme Court's consistently broad interpretation of ERISA preemption);
supra note 14 (stating text of ERISA preemption provision § 1056(d)(I)).

48. See David A. Engel, ERISA: To Preempt or not to Preempt, That is a Question!.,
XXII TORT INS. L.J. 431, 431 (1987} (citing Halland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d
1140, 1147 (4th Cir. 1985) for proposition that Congress designed broad preemption provision
to satisfy primary objective of ERISA and achieve complete uniformity of pension plan laws
by eliminating state laws regulating pensions), aff'd sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Indus.,
Inc. 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
49. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 408 (1990) (finding that Congress
designed ERISA preemption provision to ensure that only one law governs pension plans).
The Holliday Court found that, in the past, the Supreme Court had applied the preemption
provision to prevent conflicting state and federal regulation. Id. The Court reasoned that "[t]o
require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing State regulations
would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits." Id.
50. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)
(holding that ERISA preemption provision preempts all state laws which state legislatures
specifically designed to affect ERISA covered pension plans); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
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Despite the broad sweep of ERISA's preemption provision, ERISA will

not preempt a state law simply because the execution of the law implicates
a pension plan."' The court must decide whether the federal statute and the
state law conflict in such a manner as to make adherence to both laws
impossible and, if so, whether Congress intended that the federal statute
preempt.5 2 Such a conflict between ERISA and California's community
property law came before the Ninth Circuit in Ablamis v. Roper.53
IV.

Ablamis v. Roper

Mr. and Ms. Ablamis were married on August 6, 1972 and remained

married until Ms. Ablamis' death on February 1, 1988. 54 At the time of his
wife's death, Mr. Ablamis had fully vested interests in two employee benefit
profit sharing plans subject to ERISA regulation. 5s In 1987, Ms. Ablamis
executed a will that devised the major part of her estate to two trusts, one
for her children from a previous marriage, and the other for the maintenance
of her husband during his life with a remainder after his death to her

children.5 6 Any interest Ms. Ablamis had in the pension plans provided by
her husband's employer would have passed under this devise. The trustee
of her husband's retirement plans brought an action for declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California because Ms. Ablamis' executor claimed a community property

481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (stating that Congress designed ERISA's deliberately expansive language
to create pension plan regulation as exclusive federal concern); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (stating that ERISA preemption provision displaces
all state laws that fall within its sphere even if state law is consistent with ERISA substantive
requirements); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 499 n.1 (1978) (stating that
Congress designed ERISA to be comprehensive federal regulation for employee pension plans).
51. See Mackey, 486 U.S. at 829 (discussing requirement that state statute "relates to"
ERISA regulated employee benefit plan if it refers to plan); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable
HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that ERISA does not preempt statues
that have "merely tenuous, remote or peripheral" effect on pension plans). The Mackey Court
held that ERISA preempts a state law which makes a reference to or is designed to affect
ERISA pension plans because it "relate[s] to" those plans within the meaning of § 1144(a).
Mackey, 486 U.S. at 823. But see infra note 128 (discussing Mackey Court's finding that
general garnishment statute that does not make reference to pension plans is not preempted
by ERISA).
52. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (stating
preemption provision of ERISA displaces all state laws that conflict even if state law is
consistent with ERISA's goals); infra note 75 (stating Hisquierdo test for preemption of state
property law is examination of whether Congress intended to preempt and whether state law
causes major damage to substantial federal interest).
53. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. Id. The Ablamis' two pension plans had a combined value of approximately $380,000.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991) (No. 8915352).
56. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1452. Ms. Ablamis devised "all property subject to [her]
testamentary power including [her] one-half (1/2) community property interest in all community
assets and any separate property [she] may have." Id.
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interest in the pension plans.5 7 The district court granted the plan trustee's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) California law does
not allow a nonparticipant spouse to devise an interest in a retirement plan
and (2) the REA preempts any state law that arguably would allow a devise
of such an interest. 8 The executor of Ms. Ablamis' estate appealed the
judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
claiming that ERISA did not preempt California law.5 9 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision that ERISA did in fact preempt any
California law that might allow Ms. Ablamis' devise. °
A.

Majority Opinion

The Ablamis court found that the purpose of ERISA was to protect
women who are dependent on their husbands' earnings and pensions.6' The
court also found that because the provisions of ERISA, as originally enacted,
were unclear about nonemployee spouses' interests in pension benefits,
courts were split on the question whether the wife could continue to receive
benefits upon the termination of the marriage by divorce or death. 62 As a
result, the court found, Congress passed the REA to provide mandatory
survivor benefits for the nonemployee spouse 3 and to except benefits payable
4
as a result of a divorce settlement from ERISA's anti-alienation provision.
According to the Ablamis court, Congress' primary intent in passing the
REA amending ERISA was to safeguard the financial security of widows
and divorcees. 65 Congress designed the QDRO exception, the court found,

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 1453.
62. Id.
63. Id.See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1055(a)(1) (stating requirement of spousal annuity
for nonemployee spouse). Section 1055(a)(1) states that "in the case of a vested participant

who retires under the plan, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided
in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity ...." Id.See also id.§ 1055(d) (defining
qualified joint and survivor annuity). Section 1055(d) states that:
[flor purposes of this section, the term 'qualified joint and survivor annuity' means
an annuity (1) for the life of the participant with a survivor annuity for the life of

the spouse with is not less that 50 percent of (and is not greater than 100 percent
of) the amount of the annuity which is payable during the joint lives of the participant
and the spouse....

Id.
64. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1991). Congress made exceptions

to ERISA's anti-alienation provision for any QDRO relating to child support or marital
property rights to a spouse, child or other dependent of a participant, which is made pursuant
to a state domestic relations law including community property law. Id.; see supra notes 1823 and accompanying text (discussing QDRO exception to anti-alienation provision); infra
notes 147-50 and accompanying text (same).
65. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1453 (citing Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) for proposition that primary purpose of QDRO exception was to
protect pension benefits and domestic support orders for divorced spouses).
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to create a narrow exception to the anti-alienation provision for the benefit
66
of divorced women dependent on their former husbands' pension benefits.
From this reading of the legislative history of the enactment of REA,
the Ablamis court found that the QDRO exception, allowing a division of
pension benefits at divorce, does not include orders of probate courts
directing the disposition of property pursuant to testamentary instruments.6 7

The Ablamis court concluded that domestic relations orders concern a
spouse, dependent, or child, and that an estate does not fall within the
most liberal construction of those terms.e The court further explained that

if Congress had intended to create an exception to ERISA's prohibition on
alienation of pension rights that would permit a deceased spouse to bequeath

her interests in a surviving spouse's pension benefits to a third party,
Congress undoubtedly would specifically have excepted probate orders in

addition to domestic relations orders. 69 The Ablamis court concluded that
the court was bound to respect the intent of Congress and not expand the
70
list of exceptions.

The Ablamis court dismissed the notion that ERISA might not preempt
California community property law. 7' The court concluded that to permit
a nonemployee spouse's attempted bequest of one-half of a surviving
employee's pension benefits to a "third party" would do "major damage"
to ERISA's goal of preserving pension benefits for retirees and their

dependents.7 2 The Ablamis court used a rule articulated in Hisquierdo v.

66. Id. at 1454.
67. Id. at 1455.
68. Id. at 1456.
69. Id. The Ablamis court stated that Congress could have excepted probate orders to
allow Ms. Ablamis' transfer, or Congress could have excepted all transfers made pursuant to
state property laws. Id. According to the court, however, Congress chose neither alternative.
Id. The court claims that "Ms. Ablamis' beneficiaries would not qualify as an 'alternate
payee' as the term is defined in section 1056. See id. at 1456 n.11 (stating Ms. Ablamis'
beneficiaries are not alternate payees). An alternate payee must be a 'spouse, former spouse,
child or other dependent of the participant."' Id. (emphasis in original); see supra note 21
(stating § 1056(d)(3)(B) definition of "alternate payee" authorized to receive pension benefits).
Because the beneficiaries are not children of Mr. Ablamis, the court concluded that they are
not possible alternate payees. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1456 n.11 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Ninth Circuit in Stone v. Stone, however, defined the community property nonemployee
spouse as a participant in a pension plan. 632 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453
U.S. 922 (1981). Therefore, Ms. Ablamis' children would qualify as alternate payees under
the existing statute because they are the children of a plan participant so the court need not
find a new exception. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (stating that California
recognizes Ms. Ablamis as plan participant).
70. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1456 (stating that courts are bound to respect Congress'
choice to make limited exceptions to anti-alienation provision).
71. Id. at 1459. The Ablamis majority concluded that ERISA preempted California
property law. Id. The court stated, "we have no doubt whatsoever that § 1056(d) of ERISA
is generally applicable to transfers involving spouses and necessarily preempts all orders relating
to such transfers that do not fall within the specific and limited QDRO exception set forth in
REA." Id.
72. Id. at 1459-60.
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Hisquierdo73 to determine whether federal law should preempt state community property law. 74 In Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court held that to
preempt the state law, a federal statute must do more than merely conflict

with the words of the state statute. 75 Instead, a court must find that: (1)

Congress positively expressed by direct enactment the intent to preempt the
state law and (2) the state law does major damage to a clear and substantial

federal interest. 76 The Ablamis court concluded, without a specific explanation of the conflict or the damage, that ERISA and the California law
at issue in the case conflict and that the California law does major damage
to a federal interest. 7n The court held, therefore, that ERISA preempts any
California community property law that would allow Ms. Ablamis' devise.7
The Ablamis court concluded by stating that ERISA, as amended by
REA,prohibited the testamentary transfer by Ms. Ablamis of her purported
73. 493 U.S. 572 (1979).
74. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 (1979) (holding Railroad Retirement
Act preempts state community law). In Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision
of the California Supreme Court which held that Railroad Retirement Act benefits resulting
from employment during marriage are community property and are subject to division upon
divorce. Id. at 580. The Supreme Court held that Railroad Benefits are not community property
and that for courts to compensate wife from available community assets would be improper.
Id. at 589.
Congress enacted the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 to provide retirement benefits for
railroad employees. Id. at 580. These benefits are not contractual and, therefore, they can be
altered by Congress at any time. Id. at 575. Under the Act, benefits for the employee's spouse
terminate upon divorce except for amounts needed to satisfy child support or alimony
obligations. Id. at 574-75. In Hisquierdo, the nonemployee spouse sought a one half community
property interest, pursuant to California law, of the benefits acquired during the marriage
equalling 19.6% of the whole. Id. at 578. Because family property "'belongs to the laws of
the states,"' the Hisquierdo Court was reluctant to find that a federal statute preempted the
state community property laws unless "Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment'
that state law be preempted." Id. at 581 (citing Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904)). "A
mere conflict in words is not sufficient." Id. State law "must do 'major damage' to 'clear
and substantial' federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be
overridden." Id. (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)). In the four cases the
Hisquierdo Court found in which courts held that ERISA preempted community property law,
all dealt with a conflict between state and federal rules for the allocation of a federal entitlement.
Id. at 582. The Hisquierdo Court held that Congress had made a deliberate choice on the
allocation of pension funds and that state law could not disrupt the nationally uniform scheme.
Id. at 585.
The Hisquierdo Court additionally held that the wife could not receive an offsetting
award from presently available community property to compensate her for the lost interest in
the expected pension benefits. Id. at 588-89. The Court felt that allowing this offset would do
as much if not more harm to the statutory balance as granting her one-half of the expected
benefits. Id. at 588.
Justice Stewart in his dissent found that because the wife already owned the interest there
was no transfer. Id. at 599-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that because
the state interest is so strong, the federal law should not preempt the state property law. Id.
at 594-95.
76. Id. at 581.
77. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1460; id. at 1468 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 1460.
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community property interest in the surviving employee spouse's pension
benefits.7 The court further found that a spouse's testamentary devise of
an asserted community property interest in pension benefits may not deprive
an employee of any part of his pension benefits. s0 The Ninth Circuit in
Ablamis, therefore, affirmed the district court's order granting summary
judgment for the trustee of the pension plans.8'
B.

Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting judge in Ablamis began by refuting the majority's doubts
that California law would allow Ms. Ablamis' bequest.12 The district court
had relied on the existence of California's "terminable interest rule" to bar
a nonemployee spouse's bequest of an interest upon the death of either
spouse.8 3 However, the dissent pointed out, the California legislature abolished the rule in 1986 as it applied to pensions in general in response to
severe academic and judicial criticism of the rule.Y California Courts of
Appeals subsequently abolished the rule retroactively, specifically in the
context of a devise of pension benefits."' The dissent found, therefore, that,

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The Ablamis majority did not decide whether California law would permit a
testamentary transfer of the nonemployee spouse's pension benefits. Id. at 1455. The district
court, however, did find that California's terminable interest rule barred the devise. Id. at
1460.
82. Id. at 1460 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
83. Id. See also infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing California's
terminable interest rule).
84. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991). See CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800.8
(West Supp. 1992) (abolishing California's terminable interest rule); Bowman v. Bowman, 217
Cal. Rptr. 174, 178 (Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to extend terminable interest rule to private
pension plans); Chirmside v. Board of Admin. of Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 191 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 607-11 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that terminable interest rule does not apply to
employee spouse's accumulated contributions, thereby avoiding unfair result); In re Marriage
of Peterson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 (Ct. App. 1974) (stating that rule which terminates
nonemployee spouse's interest in pension benefits upon either spouse's death is unfair),
overruled by In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); Kevin R. Culhane, Toward
Pension Equality: A Reexamination of California's Terminable Interest Doctrine, 14 Sw. U.
L. REv. 613, 616-17 (1984) (criticizing terminable interest rule for its implied repeal of statutes
and fundamental unfairness to nonemployee spouse); John J. Gudebski & Susan Jovovich,
Note, Retirement Pay: A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24 HAsTla s L.J. 347, 353 (1973)
(arguing that California terminable interest rule mandating pension benefits to be mere
expectancy is unfair and unnecessary); William A. Reppy, Jr., Community and Separate
Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25
UCLA L. REv. 417, 462-73 (1978) (stating terminable interest rule derived from courts'
displeasure with community property rather than on California statutes); Deene Goodlaw
Solomon, Beyond Preemption:Accommodation of the Nonemployee Spouse's Interest Under
ERISA, 31 HASmIGs L.J. 1021, 1051-59 (1980) (discussing how terminable interest rule deprives
nonemployee spouse of full benefit of property acquired by joint effort).
85. See In re Marriage of Taylor, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486, 490-91 (Ct. App. 1987) (abolishing
terminable interest rule retroactively in divorce contest); In re Marriage of Powers, 267 Cal.
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as a result of both legislative and judicial action, no bar exists to inheritance
of any community property interest, including pension benefits, under
California law.86
The Ablamis dissent next concluded that no conflict exists between
California law and ERISA that would justify preemption.A7 The dissent
relied on a series of decisions holding that Congress did not intend for the
spendthrift provision of ERISA to apply to transfers or allocations between

employees and their spouses or dependents. 88 Additionally, because the
Hisquierdo rule states that preemption is warranted only if the state law

does major damage to a clear and substantial federal interest, 9 the correct
question in the dissenter's view was whether the "right as asserted conflicts
with the express terms of federal law and whether its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecogni-

tion."' 9 The dissent concluded that the trustee of the pension plans had
failed to carry the burden of proving that Ms. Ablamis' devise conflicted

with the express terms of ERISA. 9' Therefore, the court's analysis of the
case concerning a transfer of interest from the husband to the wife and the
court's conclusion that such a transfer does not fall under the QDRO
exception was irrelevant. 92
Rptr. 350, 358-60 (Ct. App. 1990) (applying Taylor court's abolition of terminable interest
rule to death context). The Powers court announced:
[b]y abrogation of the terminable interest rule the Legislature affirmed the right of
the nonemployee spouse to what was his or hers by virtue of the community effort
and eliminated a windfall profit to the employee spouse. This basic objective of the
statute is not dependent on whether the nonemployee spouse is living or dead at the
time these rights accrue.
Id. Consequently, "under section 4800.8, the community property interest of a nonemployee
spouse is now inheritable." Id.
86. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 1462.
88. Id. at 1463; see, e.g., Savings & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago,
717 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1983); Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559 (lth Cir. 1983); Operating
Eng'r Local No. 428 v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981); Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d
314 (2d Cir. 1979); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Ball v. Revised Retirement
Plan, 522 F. Supp. 718 (D. Colo. 1981); Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Parr, 480 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
89. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1462. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing
Hisquierdo preemption test and its application); infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text

(same).
90. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1462 (quoting Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
583 (1979) for test that plaintiff must satisfy for ERISA to preempt state law). The Ablamis
dissent stated:
[t]hus, the appellee [trustee] may not prevail in this case simply by showing a mere
conflict between the bequest and the language of ERISA, or by showing that
Congress did not contemplate the type of bequest at issue here. Rather, in order to
prevail, the appellee must demonstrate that California law allowing the non-employee
spouse to bequeath her community property share of pension benefits would do
"major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal interests.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1462.
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The Ablamis dissent next questioned the court's conclusion that Congress intended the REA to preempt state property law in this instance. 93 At
the time Congress passed the REA, the courts were split on whether they
could award pension benefits to a nonemployee spouse in a divorce settlement4 Congress resolved that specific issue by including the QDRO exception in the REA. 9s The majority claimed that courts should interpret
Congress' failure to authorize another exception for probate orders as a
deliberate exclusion,9 but the dissent countered that probate orders in
community property states were not at issue at the time of the enactment
of the REA.97 Transfers by nonemployee spouses were not at issue in 1984
because the vast majority of states either followed the common law and
did not recognize that the nonemployee spouse had any interest in the
employee spouse's pension plans or were community property states with
terminable interest rules preventing a devise of any such existing interest.98
Because Congress never discussed the issue of probate orders in community
property states, the dissent found it unsurprising that Congress did not
include them in the QDRO exception.9
The Ablamis dissent also questioned the court's characterization of
Congress' goals in passing ERISA. 1°° The majority stated, without explanation, that the application of California's community property law would
do major damage to federal interests. 01' The dissent argued that because
ERISA allows the employee spouse to bequeath to a third party any portion
of benefits remaining at the time of his death, the nonemployee spouse
with equal ownership rights should be able to do the same.' ° The dissent
reasoned that a court does not offend Congress' goal of ensuring that
ERISA views both spouses in a marriage as part of an economic partnership
by applying a state community property law allowing the nonemployee
spouse the same right as her husband to bequeath an interest in his retirement
plans.103
93. Id. at i1465.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1458.
97. Id. at 1465. The Ablamis majority claimed that Congress expressly chose not to
except probate orders from the spendthrift restriction by including in the restriction an exception
for divorces. Id.at 1458. The dissent, however, found no indication in the legislative history
that the issue of probate orders ever was considered by Congress. Id. at 1465. The dissent
believed that Congress' goal was to resolve the debate over divorce that had been in the courts,
but not preclude debates over new issues. Id. The dissent concluded, "as no debate had yet
emerged on the issue of probate, it is unsurprising that the issue of probate orders never
reached Congress." Id.
98. Id.at 1463.
99. Id. at 1465.
100. Id. at 1466.
101. Id. at 1459-60; see supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating state law must do
major damage to federal interest as component of preemption test).
102. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1465 (9th Cir. 1991); see infra notes 191-95 and
accompanying text (stating federal interest not harmed by application of California law).
103. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1465.
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Finally, the Ablamis dissent questioned the court's conclusion that the
outcome reached by the majority is sensible and just.' °4 The dissent claimed
that under the court's holding that there is no transferable interest, the
court treated Ms. Ablamis more unfairly than before the passage of REAdespite the fact that Congress designed the REA to increase the rights of
the nonemployee spouse. 05 In a community property state such as California
a nonemployee spouse need not be divorced or widowed to gain a right to
marital property. The court's holding, however, forces this common-law
result because the decision requires the nonemployee spouse to forfeit
property rights if she dies married.1°6 To avoid this legally unnecessary and
morally unjust result, the dissent would have reversed the district court's
decision and allowed Ms. Ablamis to devise her community property interest
in the pension plans. 1°7
V.

ANALYsIs oF Ablamis v. Roper

From the majority and dissenting opinions in Ablamis, it is clear that
the law concerning ERISA's preemption of community property law is far
from settled. 0 8 The law, however, is not so opaque as to necessitate two
totally inconsistent resolutions of the case. The conflict between the opinions
is more than a simple disagreement about application of law to fact. The
majority and dissent disagreed on the status and meaning of the ERISA
preemption provision, ° 9 the Hisquierdo preemption test," 0 the existence of
California's terminable interest rule,"' and the nature of California community property law." 2 These disagreements are so central to the nature of
both ERISA and California community property law that one of the

104. Id. at 1468.
105. Id. at 1468-69. See Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating ERISA
does not preempt state court order requiring pension plan to pay community property share
to former spouse), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re Marriage of Campa, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 362, 368 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding that state interest of fair division between former
spouses has no bearing on Congress' interest to assure genuine pension rights), appealdismissed,
444 U.S. 1028 (1980). Both Stone and Campa are pre-REA decisions that provide the
nonemployee spouse with more protection and property rights under California law than the
Ablamis court provides under the REA. Stone, 632 F.2d at 742; Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. at
368. Clearly Ms. Ablamis was in a worse position after the passage of the REA than she had

been in before.
106. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1468 (stating that majority's decision encourages spouses
to divorce so that nonemployee spouse can be guaranteed transferable property rights in
pension plans).

107. Id. at 1468-69.
108. See supra notes 54-107 and accompanying text (discussing Ablamis decision).
109. See supra notes 71-78, 87-92 and accompanying text (stating interpretation of ERISA

preemption provision).
110. See supra notes 73-78, 89-91 and accompanying text (observing scope of Hisquierdo
preemption test).
I11. See supra notes 81, 82-86 and accompanying text (stating status of California's
terminable interest rule).
112. See supra notes 81, 82-86 and accompanying text (stating status of California's
terminable interest rule).
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opinions must express an incorrect statement of the current status of the
law.
Because of this inconsistency in the opinions, the only way to judge
the merit of the Ablamis majority and dissenting opinions is to examine
California community property law and ERISA preemption law and to
apply them to the facts of the Ablamis case. The proper questions of law
are: 1) whether California community property law allows a predeceasing
nonemployee spouse to devise an interest in a pension plan; 2) whether
ERISA, by its terms, preempts California community property law through
operation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; and
3) whether the result reached constitutes a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The answers to these questions will provide the framework
for determining the correct holding in the case.
A.

California Community Property Law

The first issue is whether California law allows Ms. Ablamis to devise
her community property interest in the pension plans." 3 The district court
held that the continued existence of California's terminable interest rule
prevented Ms. Ablamis from devising any interest in the pension plans

because her interest terminated at her death. "1 4 The California Supreme
Court created the terminable interest rule by holding that the nonemployee
spouse's interest in pension benefits terminates upon the death of either
spouse so that an attempted devise of that interest is invalid."' In 1986,
however, the California Legislature abolished the terminable interest rule in

113. Contra Brief for Appellee at 39, Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991)
(No. 89-15352). The trustee of the Ablamis pension funds argues that even if California law
would allow a devise of a community property interest in the funds, the terms of the contract
prevent the transfer. Id.
The trustee's argument has no foundation. If California law does apply, Ms. Ablamis
will not be bound by a unilateral contract purporting to divest her of her property right in
half of the pension assets. According to California law, a community asset will be classified
as one spouse's separate property only if the other spouse signs a waiver or release document.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 142 (West 1991). Because Ms. Ablamis did not sign a release form, her
estate retains any interest recognized by California law. Id.
114. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating holding by district
court that California's terminable interest rule exists).
115. See Waite v. Waite, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333 (1972) (holding nonemployee spouse's
interest in pension benefits terminates at death), overruled by In re Marriage of Brown, 126
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 261-62 (1963)
(holding nonemployee spouse has no claim to benefits after employee spouse's death if employee
spouse designated third party beneficiary for benefits); Chirmside v. Board of Admin. of Pub.
Employees Retirement Sys., 191 Cal. Rptr. 605, 606-08 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing Waite and
Benson and development of California's terminable interest rule). The Chirmside court explained that the Benson and Waite courts established the rule that the nonemployee spouse's
community property interest in a pension terminates upon the death of either spouse. Id. at
607. The nonemployee spouse, therefore, may neither receive benefits at the death of the
employee spouse if he designates a third party beneficiary, nor devise benefits at her death.
Id. at 606.
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the context of dividing retirement benefits upon divorce."16 The California
courts then found that this abolition of the terminable interest rule should
be applied retroactively and that it also should be applied to transfers at
no longer prevents a tesdeath." 7 The terminable interest rule, therefore,
8
tamentary transfer of pension benefits."
In addition to removing the judicial barrier to a devise, the California
Legislature recognized the right of owners to devise property by specifically
creating Ms. Ablamis' right to devise her interest in the pension plans. 119
The California Probate Code states that a decedent may devise an interest
in a qualified pension plan at death because the decedent is an owner of a
transferrable interest in such plans. 20 Therefore, because she was an owner,
California law entitles Ms. Ablamis to transfer her community property
interest in the pension benefits.
B. ERISA Preemption
California courts and the California Legislature have stated that the
terminable interest rule no longer exists and that no bar exists to testamentary disposition of interests in pension plans.12 ' Preemption by ERISA of
California probate law authorizing such a devise, therefore, is the only legal
barrier that would have prevented Ms. Ablamis' intended transfer.' z2 Under
the Hisquierdotest, Ms. Ablamis' devise was invalid only if the court found
that Congress specifically intended that ERISA preempt a devise authorized
by the state's community property law and if that devise did major damage
to a federal interest.1'3
116. See 1986 Cal. Stat. c. 686, § 2 (stating that intent of legislature is to abolish
terminable interest rule for retirement benefits), reprinted in historical and statutory notes to
CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.8 (West Supp. 1992). This statute abolished the holdings of Benson
and Waite that had created the terminable interest rule. Id. The California Legislature passed
this section as explanation to CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800.8 (West Supp. 1992). Id.
117. See In re Marriage of Powers, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding
abolition of terminable interest rule retroactive in proceeding where property rights have not
yet been adjudicated); Estate of Austin, 254 Cal. Rptr. 372, 373 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding
legislative abolition of terminable interest rule applicable to death context).
118. See Powers, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 356 (stating nonemployee spouse's community property
interests in pension benefits are inheritable under California law).
119. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 262 (West 1991) (defining "beneficiary" as person entitled
to take property interest); id. § 263(b)(12) (stating employee or "other owner" of plan interest
may transfer that interest); id. § 265 (defining "disclaimer" as writing which renounces interest
otherwise receivable to beneficiary); id. § 266 (stating "employee benefit plan" includes pension
apd retirement plans); id. § 267(a) (defining "interest" to include whole or part of real or
personal property); id. § 267(b)(12) (stating "interest" includes benefits created under employee
benefit plan).
120. Id. § 263(b)(12); id. § 267(b)(12).
121. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing legislative and judicial
abolition of California's terminable interest rule).
122. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1461-62 (9th Cir. 1991) (Fletcher, J., dissenting)
(arguing that California law allows Ms. Ablamis' devise, therefore, only majority's holding
prevents transfer).
123. See supranotes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing Hisquierdorule for analyzing
preemption of state property law by federal statute).
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To satisfy the first prong of the Hisquierdo test, the Ablamis majority
needed to find that ERISA's preemption provision specifically preempts any
state law, including community property law, that relates to an employee
benefit plan. '2 The court's statement that the state law contravenes ERISA's
anti-alienation provision simply did not answer the first prong. ' 2 The
Ablamis court failed to apply the specific facts of the case to the term
"relate to" as stated in the- preemption provision and as defined by the
Supreme Court. The Ablamis court should have found whether California
community property law as applied to Ms. Ablamis relates to an ERISA
pension as the Supreme Court defined the term in Mackey v. Lanier
26
Collection Agency & Service, Inc.

In Mackey the Supreme Court considered whether or not a Georgia
garnishment statute related to an ERISA pension plan. 127 The Mackey Court
held that ERISA preempts a state statute that singles out an ERISA employee

benefit plan for different treatment or regulation. 28 The Court in Mackey
found Congressional intent to allow section 1144(a) to preempt any state
laws designed specifically to affect ERISA pension plans.

29

In Ablamis,

124. See supra note 75 (stating Hisquierdo preemption test); supra note 4 (stating text of
ERISA preemption provision § 1144(a)).
125. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1460. Rather than concluding that ERISA preempts state law
because the application of California property law causes a different result than application
of ERISA provisions, the Ablamis court should have analyzed what relationship existed between
the state and federal statutes to find a conflict. According to the Hisquierdo test, the conflict
derives from congressional intent. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 583 (1979). To
find preemption, the state law must conflict with the express terms of a federal statute. Id.
Congress, therefore, must specifically intend for the state law to be preempted. Id.
126. 486 U.S. 825 (1988); see supra note 4 (requiring under § 1144(a) that ERISA preempts
state statute if state law "relate[s] to" pension plan).
127. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)
(holding that ERISA § 1144(a) preempted specific Georgia garnishment statute that made
reference to ERISA plan, but general garnishment statute was not preempted). In Mackey the
Supreme Court considered the validity of Georgia statutes which allowed for garnishment of
welfare plans pursuant to money judgments obtained against the beneficiaries. Id. at 827-28.
One statute specifically identified ERISA welfare plans as subject to the statute if a court
ordered the garnishment pursuant to a judgment for alimony or for child support. Id. at 828
n.2. The Court found that this state law "relates to" ERISA benefit plans primarily because
it specifically refers to the plans. Id. at 829. The Mackey Court reaffirmed previous holdings
that § 1144(a) preempts a statute that the state legislature specifically designed to affect
employee benefit plans. Id. The Court also held that ERISA will preempt the state law even
if it is consistent with the substantive goals or provisions of ERISA. Id. Consequently, the
Mackey Court held that ERISA preempts the first Georgia statute. Id. at 830.
The second statute at issue was the general garnishment statute. Id. The Mackey Court
considered whether the general statute related to the ERISA welfare plan. Id. at 830-31. The
Court found that certain ERISA provisions and several aspects of the statute's structure
indicated that Congress did not intend to prevent state mechanisms for executing judgments
against plans, even when that would prevent participants from receiving their benefits. Id. at
831-32. The Court held that ERISA did not preempt the state garnishment mechanism because
it was the only method to enforce a judgment against an ERISA plan. Id. at 834.
128. Id. at 830; see supra note 4 (stating text of ERISA preemption provision § 1144(a)).
129. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830. The Mackey Court's holding that a specific reference to
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however, the California community property statute makes no mention of
specific property rights, nor does the statute refer specifically to a pension
plan covered by ERISA.130
The Mackey Court did, however, address a question similar to that
presented in the Ablamis case: did Congress intend to preempt general state

statutes that do not refer to pension plans? 31 The Mackey Court found
that Congress did not intend to preempt state law mechanisms for executing

judgments against ERISA plans, even when application of state law prevented participants from receiving benefits. 32 The statute at issue in Mackey
had an impact on plans and benefits, but the Court held that because it
did not "relate to" an ERISA plan ERISA did not preempt the statute.

33

California community property law, therefore, does not necessarily "relate
to" an ERISA plan just because it allows disposition of plan benefits or

recognizes property rights in a manner different from the common-law
framework of ERISA.' 34

To satisfy the second prong of the Hisquierdotest, the Ablamis majority
stated that the devise in question would do major damage to a federal
interest if the court applied community property law.1 3 The Ablamis court
did not, however, specify how the devise would damage a federal interest
or to what extent that interest would be damaged. 36 The Supreme Court
has stated that complementary federal and state goals will not save a

an ERISA plan in the state statute impermissibly "relates to" a plan is logical considering the
plain meaning of the words in § 1144(a). Id.
130. See CAL. PRoa. CODE § 28 (West 1991) (stating that community property includes
all property acquired by either spouse during marriage).
131. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 830-31. The Mackey Court considered whether ERISA preempted
Georgia's general garnishment statute. Id. The general statute did not single out or specifically
mention any ERISA plans. Id.
132. Id. at 831-32.
133. See id. at 840-41 (stating that language and structure of ERISA indicate that Congress
did not intend to preempt general Georgia garnishment statute); Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable
HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that ERISA preempts state claims
for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of good faith against the pension
plan because these claims are at heart of ERISA's exclusive regulation).
134. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (stating that Congress
intended that ERISA preempt state laws related to pension plans, not to pension benefits).
The Fort Halifax Court held that ERISA did not preempt a Maine statute because the state
statute did not burden the ERISA administrative practices with a patchwork scheme of
regulation. Id. at 11-12. ERISA, therefore, does not preempt all state statutes that have an
impact on employee benefits. Id. at 11.
135. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra note 75 (stating
Hisquierdo test requirement of damage to federal interest before finding of preemption).
136. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1459-60 (observing that application of California community
property law would do major damage to Congress' goal of ensuring pension benefits). The
Ablamis court does not specify why application of California law threatens pension benefits.
Id. Additionally, the majority admits that ERISA does allow an equivalent testamentary
transfer from Mr. Ablamis to a third party. Id. at 1457 n.12. The majority does not explain,
however, why one transfer violates the goals of Congress, but the other does not.
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conflicting state statute from preemption. 37 Therefore, the fact that ERISA
and California law have the common goal of pension benefit equity will
not alone save the state statute from preemption. 3 That fact, however,
does indicate that there may be no major damage to a substantial federal

interest if a court applies California law.'39 According to the Hisquierdo
test, a federal statute will not preempt state property law unless application
of the state law seriously damages a federal interest. 4° To satisfy the test,
the Ablamis court needed to specify
exactly how application of California
4
law damages a federal interest.' '

Because the Ablamis court's analysis satisfied neither prong of the
Hisquierdo test, the court identified no conflict between ERISA and California community property law that required preemption 42 The Ablamis
court, therefore, should not have been so eager to dismiss the application
of state law in this case. The majority seemed to rely on the misconception
that a prohibited transfer of interest from Mr. Ablamis to Ms. Ablamis
took place. 43 This is an incorrect and misleading finding. California law
considered Ms. Ablamis to be an owner of and participant in the pension
plans.'" Because no transfer occurred between the spouses, the court did
45
not need to analyze whether the QDRO exception permits such a transfer.'

137. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988)
(stating that ERISA preempts consistent state law if it conflicts with ERISA statute); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (same).
138. See supra note 127 (stating Mackey Court's holding that mere concurrence of statutory
goals will not save state statute from preemption).
139. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 595-96 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(defining what conflict results in damage to federal interest). The Hisquierdo dissent claimed
that a state statute damaged a federal interest when the state law and the federal law defined
property rights differently. Id. Damage, therefore, requires more than common state and
federal goals. Id.
140. See id. at 583 (stating that injury to objectives of federal statute must be consequence
of applying state law).
141. Id.
142. See supra notes 123-41 and accompanying text (discussing application of Hisquierdo
preemption test).
143. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing whether court
can classify Ms. Ablamis as "former spouse" as defined in § 1056(d)(3)(k)). The fact that the
Ablamis court discusses whether or not Ms. Ablamis falls into the QDRO exception suggests
that it is concerned about a husband to wife transfer. Id. This clouds the other issue that the
court addresses-the owner to beneficiary transfer from Ms. Ablamis to her children. Id.
These two transfers should not be confused, especially if one accepts the fact that no transfer
took place between Mr. and Ms. Ablamis. Id. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text
(discussing California law recognition of Ms. Ablamis as owner of pension plans).
144. See Stone v. Stone, 632 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that nonemployee
spouse is participant in pension plan because she enjoys same rights to enforce ERISA provisions
as employee spouse), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981); In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 639 (1976) (discussing division of community interest in pension plans).
145. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1056(d)(1) (stating ERISA anti-alienation provision); id.
§ 1056(d)(3)(B) (defining QDRO exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision). Section
1056(d)(3)(B) states that a QDRO is a domestic relations order "which ... assigns to an
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The fact that Ms. Ablamis did not fit under the definition of a "former
spouse" is irrelevant.' 46
As well as regarding Ms. Ablamis as the transferee of benefits, the
court concluded that her children did not qualify as dependents of a plan
participant. 47 The QDRO exception, however, does allow transfer of benefits
to dependents of plan participants.' 4 Rather than conclude that Ms. Ablamis'
children were not dependents of Mr. Ablamis, the Ablamis court should
have acknowledged that because Ms. Ablamis was a participant under
California law, her children were dependents of a participant. 49 Because
she was a participant, the transfer of benefits to the children may fall under
the QDRO exception. The Ablamis court, however, was most likely correct
in concluding that a testamentary transfer to children does not qualify as
a "child support" payment. 50 The QDRO exception, therefore, may not
be the best basis on which to allow Ms. Ablamis' transfer.
Even if the transfer to Ms. Ablamis' children did not qualify under the
QDRO exception, California law recognizes that Ms. Ablamis had the same
right to transfer benefits as Mr. Ablamis.11' Before Congress passed the
REA establishing the spousal annuity requirement, California law limited
the employee's devise to one-half of the pension benefits, recognizing that
the spouse had a property interest in the benefits.112 Additionally, ERISA
allows Mr. Ablamis to devise up to fifty percent of the pension funds
remaining at his death to any third party. 53 Ms. Ablamis, as a participant

alternate payee" a right to receive pension benefits. Id. Neither the QDRO nor the antialienation provision apply if no court ordered a transfer of the right to'receive benefits under
the Ablamis' pensions. Id. Ms. Ablamis' community property interest in the pension funds,
therefore, need not satisfy § 1056 to exist. Id.
146. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1456 (noting that because Ms. Ablamis is "deceased
spouse" rather than "former spouse," she does not qualify as alternate payee under QDRO
exception to anti-alienation provision).
147. Id. at 1460 n.17.
148. See supra note 21 (defining § 1056 QDRO exception to ERISA's anti-alienation
provision). Section 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) states that a domestic relations order is a court order
which "relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property rights
to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant." Id.
149. See Ablamis v-. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that Ms. Ablamis'
children are beneficiaries of trusts at issue); supra note 145 (arguing that Ms. Ablamis is
participant in pension plans).
150. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1455 (concluding that child support is not testamentary in
nature, therefore, probate order granting Ms. Ablamis' children pension benefits would not
fall under QDRO exception of § 1056).
151. See supra note 119 (listing California statutes which recognize both spouses as equal
owners of pension plans).
152. See Chirmside v. Board. of Admin. of Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 191 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 610 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding that employee spouse's power to designate beneficiary
is limited to amount of his community property interest in benefits).
153. See supra note 63 (defining § 1055 requirement of qualified joint and survivor
annuity). Section 1055(d) states that the surviving spouse must receive at least 50% of the
benefits after the participant's death. Id. The decedent, therefore, can devise the other 50%
of the benefits to whomever he chooses. Id. See also Profit Sharing Plan Comm. for Employers
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and owner under California law, therefore, should have had the same right
to transfer fifty percent of the marital property.154 If she did not have that
right, her ownership rights in the pensions were worth much less than Mr.
Ablamis' rights.155 As a plan participant, therefore, Ms. Ablamis'
transfer
1
did satisfy both California state law and ERISA requirements.
C.

16

Taking of Property Without Compensation

In addition to the preemption question, there is a Fifth Amendment
takings issue that neither the Ablamis court nor the parties addressed. The

Ablamis estate has a strong argument that the court's application of ERISA
to preempt California property law resulted in an unconstitutional taking

of Ms. Ablamis' property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.' This argument exists because the Ablamis decision
completely destroyed Ms. Ablamis' power to devise a property interest that
California law recognized she possessed at her death.'
Under California law, Ms. Ablamis owned a one-half interest in the
pension plans.'3 9 During the marriage, state law deemed her to have conof Republic Fin. Serv., Inc. v. MBank Dallas, N.A., 683 F. Supp. 592, 595 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(holding that employee spouse can designate third party beneficiary for plan benefits that do
not pass to spouse pursuant to survivor annuity); Art Builders Profit Sharing Plan v. Bosely,
649 F. Supp. 848, 853 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that designated beneficiaries of employee spouse
are entitled to remainder of pension account balance after spousal annuity is paid); Naddeo
v. Officers & Employees Pension Plan of Laundry, Dry Cleaning & Dye Workers' Int'l Union,
637 F. Supp. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that employee spouse's beneficiary is entitled to
one-half of pension benefit account).
154. See In re Marriage of Peterson, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184, 194 (Ct. App. 1974) (arguing
that despite California rule that court must follow, because wife contributed equally to
husband's pension, court should not deprive her of her equal share), overruled by In re
Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
155. See infra notes 157-76 and accompanying text (analyzing Ms. Ablamis' loss of
property rights as taking of property without just compensation).
156. See supra note 63 (stating that § 1055 allows employee spouse to devise up to 50%
of pension assets); supra note 119 and accompanying text (citing California statutes that
authorize Ms. Ablamis to devise her property interest in pensions).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment states: "[n]or shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id. Because the issue of whether ERISA
preempts California law that authorizes a devise of pension benefits by the nonemployee
spouse is disputed, Ms. Ablamis had a reasonable expectation that she would have a full
property interest in the plans. See In re Marriage of Powers, 267 Cal. Rptr. 350, 358 (Ct.
App. 1990) (stating that husband's reliance on existence of terminable interest rule would not
prevent retroactive application of new statute promoting equitable distribution). Additionally,
because Ms. Ablamis' rights in the plans originated when they married in 1972, she had a
property interest before the enactment of ERISA in 1974 or the REA in 1984. Ablamis v.
Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
158. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that Ablamis holding prevents Ms.
Ablamis from devising interest in pension plans).
159. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 28 (West 1991) (stating that community property means
"community property heretofore or hereafter acquired during marriage by a married person
while domiciled in this state"); id. § 100 (stating that "upon the death of a married person,
one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half belongs
to the decedent").
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tributed one-half of the money used to finance the pensions, and, therefore,
she had identical ownership rights in the plan assets to those of her
husband. 6° Under ERISA, Ms. Ablamis enjoyed the same fights as Mr.
Ablamis during her life because, in the event of divorce, ERISA allows a
division of the pension benefits pursuant to property rights recognized by
state law.16 ' When she died, however, her rights were no longer identical to
her husband's rights.16 2 The Ablamis court's application of the ERISA
preemption provision eliminated Ms. Ablamis' right to dispose of her
property through testamentary transfer, even though Mr. Ablamis could, at
his death, under state law and ERISA, dispose of one-half of the benefits
to anyone he designated. 63 The once equal spouses were no longer equal.'6
The Supreme Court has held that a permanent elimination of a property
right by state action constitutes a taking. 65 The theoretical basis of the
160. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text (discussing nature of ownership and
acquisition of property in community property states).
161. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing QDRO exception allowing
divorcing spouses to partition pension benefits pursuant to state property law); supra note 14
(stating text of § 1056(d)(1) ERISA anti-alienation provision). Mr. and Ms. Ablamis had
identical rights in the pension plans while alive because under the § 1056 anti-alienation
provision, neither spouse could make an inter vivos transfer of the right to receive benefits.

Id.
162. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Ms. Ablamis
has no testamentary power over pension plan); id. at 1457 n.12 (acknowledging that employee
spouse may devise pension benefits).
163. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1055 (stating requirement of spousal annuity of at least
one-half of pension benefits). Section 1055 requires that "[e]ach pension plan to which this
section applies shall provide that-'(1) in the case of a vested participant who retires under the
plan, the accrued benefit payable to such participant shall be provided in the form of a
qualified joint and survivor annuity .... " Id. The spousal annuity restricts the dispositional
power of the employee spouse, but his right to devise is not eliminated. Id.; see also supra
note 153 (discussing case law concerning § 1055 spousal annuity requirement and employee
spouse's ability to designate beneficiary for residue of benefit account).
164. See In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1976) (arguing that because
pension plans consist of deferred compensation, pension benefits are property interests not
expectancies). If the asset at issue was the family home, it would be clear from California
community property law that each spouse had a one half interest in fee simple. See CAL.
PROB. CODE § 28 (West 1991) (stating that community property is all real and personal property
acquired during marriage). Each spouse contributes one half of the community assets toward
the purchase of the house. California law recognizes joint rights during the marriage and
allows for division of the value at the divorce or death of either spouse. See id. § 100 (stating
that parties divide community property equally when marriage dissolves at death of one
spouse); CAL. Crv. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1992) (stating that spouses divide community
property equally upon divorce). If a federal statute prevented any disposition of the house at
the death of either spouse, a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment would result. See
supra note 157 (stating text of Takings Clause). Ablamis is not a mere restriction on property
rights, but a conversion of the fee simple into a life estate. See infra note 170 (stating nature
of Ms. Ablamis' loss). Under California law Ms. Ablamis' interest in the pension plans is
identical to her interest in the family home. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 267 (West 1991) (indicating
that California property law considers interest in home equivalent to interest in employee
benefit plan). The loss of her right to devise her property interest is a loss rising to the level
of a taking. See supra note 157 (stating text of Takings Clause).
165. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (stating that
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Fifth Amendment's prohibition of the taking of property without just
compensation is to prevent the state from forcing one person to bear the
cost of a societal benefit.166 The situations, therefore, in which courts have
refused to find a taking generally involve the granting of a reciprocal benefit
to the individual whose property rights are eliminated by the state action.

6

If the individual receives a similarly valued benefit in return for the lost
property right, the government action is analogous to a forced sale or
exercise of eminent domain.1 6s A taking occurs, by definition, when an
individual loses a property right but the state does not compensate with an
identifiable and specific gain. 6 9
Ms. Ablamis has lost an important property right through the interpretation of ERISA by the Ablamis court. The Ablamis ruling did not merely
interfere with Ms. Ablamis' expectations of her property rights or limit the

use of her property.' 70 Her ability to transfer her property interest in the
pension plans to her devisees is a distinct right that the court eliminated,

not merely abridged.' 7' For this loss she has received no reciprocal benefit.

Congress passed ERISA and the REA to provide a societal benefit, but the
requirement to grant permanent easement would have been taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979) (stating that loss of economic advantage may not be taking,
but loss of recognized right to interest in property is taking).
166. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (discussing purpose of
Takings Clause). The Armstrong Court asserted that the purpose of forbidding uncompensated
taking of private property for a public purpose is to "bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole." Id.
167. See United States v. Sperry Corp. 493 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1989) (holding that one and
one-half percent deduction on awards received from Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was
not taking, but rather reasonable user fee for benefit to claimants provided by Tribunal);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1980) (stating that zoning regulations protect
residents of city from ill effects of urbanization, therefore, zoning benefits both injured
individual and public).
168. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831 (stating one principal use of eminent domain power is
to assure conveyance of desired property interest, however, government must pay for property
taken).
169. See supra note 157 (stating just compensation language of Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment).
170. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 223 (1986) (stating
that Congress has power to create burdens for some people to benefit others). The Connolly
Court listed minimum wages, price controls and causes of action as examples of regulations
that burdened individuals but did not result in a taking. Id. The Court implied that these
types of adjustments are the price of congressional regulation of "commercial and other
human affairs." Id. Ms. Ablamis' rights, however, were not merely adjusted, but completely
eliminated. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that Ms.
Ablamis has no devisable interest in pension plans).
171. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1460 (holding that Ms. Ablamis may not devise interest in
pension plans); Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63 (stating that taking occurs when state prevents best
use of property or extinguishes fundamental attribute of ownership). The Agins Court argued
that a taking occurred if the injured property owner was unable to pursue reasonable uses of
her property other than the use prohibited by the state. Id. Any diminution in market value
the owner may suffer is minimal compared to the benefit to the city and its citizens and,
therefore, is not a taking. Id.
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benefit to nonemployee spouses as a group does not compensate Ms.
72
Ablamis for her loss.'
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the specific question of whether
ERISA preemption of community property law constitutes a taking.' It is
clear, however, that because Congress and the courts should respect individual property rights and refrain from drafting or construing laws to create
unredressed takings, this is an issue that must be decided. 74 The Ablamis
decision is a classic taking that requires Congress to compensate Ms.
Ablamis' loss, or to change the language of the ERISA preemption provision.'17 Congress should amend the ERISA statute to recognize the realities
of California law and of the eight other community property states to avoid
the huge potential cost of compensating nonemployee spouses in these
76
states.
VI.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

As illustrated by the previous analysis, no unassailably correct rule exists
that the Ablamis court could have followed.'"n From the perspective of Ms.
172. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(stating that taking can occur irregardless of importance of public benefit or minimal impact
on individual); supra note 11 (stating that, in passing ERISA, Congress intended to protect
workers by creating uniform regulation for employee benefits); supra note 17 (stating that, in
passing the REA, Congress intended to ensure greater equity between spouses).
173. See In re Marriage of Campa, 152 Cal. Rptr. 362, 368 (Ct. App. 1979) (finding that
ERISA does not preempt state order dividing pension benefits because ERISA is concerned
with maintaining benefits before they reach beneficiary and spouse), appeal dismissed, 444
U.S. 1028 (1980). In Campa, the jurisdictional statement asked whether ERISA preempted
California community property law. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1464 (9th Cir. 1991).
By dismissing the appeal for want of a federal question, the Supreme Court answered that
question in the negative. Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745, 748 (9th
Cir. 1980). With this dismissal the Supreme Court has stated indirectly that ERISA does not
preempt community property law. Id. If California law is not preempted, therefore, Ms.
Ablamis has a property interest to devise which the Ablamis decision takes from her.
174. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (stating that court may not compel Congress to exercise power of
eminent domain); id. (stating that Takings Clause is designed to limit freedom of governmental
authorities); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that individuals cannot
be forced to bear public burdens); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 924 (N.D. Cal. 1978)
(stating that courts interpret federal laws consistently with state property law because Congress
generally avoids undue conflicts), aff'd, 632 F.2d 740 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981).
175. See First English EvangelicalLutheran Church, 482 U.S. at 321 (holding that when
taking occurs, government may choose either to compensate injured party, or to change statute
and eliminate taking).
176. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1144(a) (stating text of ERISA's preemption provision).
Section 1144(a) states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Id. Congress could amend this section
to specify a limitation on the scope of the preemption. My suggestion for an amendment is:
"Section (a) is not intended to prevent the application of State property law to the apportionment of plan benefits pursuant to termination of marriage through death or divorce." See
also infra note 196 (proposing alternate anti-alienation provision to recognize community
property interests).
177. See supra notes 113-76 and accompanying text (analyzing scope of California com-
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Ablamis and other California citizens, however, the choice to uphold
community property law clearly is the better result.' 78 California has strong
policy reasons to want the court to find in favor of Ms. Ablamis' right to
devise her community property interest in the pension plans and to arrive
at an interpretation of ERISA allowing that outcome.
The Ablamis decision will be unwelcome precedent for community
property states because the primary effect of this decision, notwithstanding
the most basic principles of the community property system, is to treat an
employee spouse differently from a nonemployee spouse. 7 9 While working,
the spouses equally contribute community assets to fund a pension plan.
When the spouses receive benefits during retirement, the two members of
the marriage have identical rights and power over the pension benefits.1s
Upon death, however, the Ablamis court has determined that it would be
unjust for the property interests to remain identical.' While Mr. Ablamis
can devise up to fifty percent of the benefits to anyone he chooses, the
Ablamis court prevented Ms. Ablamis from doing the same.8 2 The court
in Ablamis did not adequately address why one spouse can devise an interest
in the pension to a third party while the other cannot devise the same
interest to her children. 3 This is an unjust result because the majority
destroys the reasonable expectations of the citizens of community property
states.14 The court's holding deprives the nonemployee spouse of the op-

munity property law, scope of ERISA, and possible taking of Ms. Ablamis' property without
compensation).
178. See FuNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 85 (discussing origins of California
community property law). In 1850, California chose community property law to be its system
of property ownership. Id. Obviously, the application of that law is in the best interests of
the state and its citizens. Id.
179. See supra note 33 (stating that primary purpose of community property is equal
treatment of husband and wife).
180. See supra note 33 (stating that primary purpose of community property is equal
treatment of husbend and wife).
181. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ablamis court stated
that "there is no reason to allow a predeceasing nonemployee spouse to leave part of her
surviving employee spouse's pension to a friend, lover, or relative." Id.; see also supra note
145 (discussing ownership of Ablamis' pension plans). The court did not recognize that it
would be unjust to strip Ms. Ablamis of a property right. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457. Mr.
Ablamis does not lose any property right by Ms. Ablamis' devise-he never owned her onehalf interest in the pension. Id.
182. See supra note 153 (discussing § 1055 authorization for employee spouse to designate
beneficiary of remaining pension fund upon death).
183. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457 n.12 (stating that ERISA provides employee spouse
with more pension benefits than nonemployee spouse, thus justifying employee spouse's ability
to devise up to 50% of pension benefits at death).
184. The impact of the Ablamis decision on community property states is best illustrated
through a hypothetical example of its effect. A painter is married to a banker. When they
retire, the husband/painter has saved $100,000 from the sale of his paintings. The wife/banker
has $1 million in pension plans regulated by ERISA.
Under pre-ERISA common law and ignoring spousal election, each spouse has complete
ownership of his or her own asset and no rights in the other spouse's asset. Upon the death
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portunity to devise the share of the pension benefits generated by the assets
she contributed. 5
If the Ablamis court had cited a compelling reason to destroy the
parties' reasonable expectations, the holding might be an acceptable result.
The majority, however, seems to have based its conclusion on a misunderstanding of California law rather than on a necessity for preemption. The
Ablamis majority opinion dwells on the supposed divestment of Mr. Ablamis'
interest in his pensions but ignores the effect the decision has on Ms.
Ablamis' interest. 8 6 Most importantly, the majority fails to recognize that
the interest Mr. Ablamis was in danger of losing was never his to begin
with. 8 7 Mr. Ablamis never possessed the entire interest in the plan benefits. 88
The court should have considered the nature of ownership while both were

of either spouse his or her asset passes to his or her estate, therefore, the husband's estate
would have $100,000 and the wife's estate would have her right to receive any balance
remaining to be paid from her plan. ERISA and REA alter this by requiring at least one-half
of the banker's remaining pension benefits to go to the painter when the banker dies. The
banker, therefore, would lose the ability to transfer one-half of her asset while the painter
would retain complete control of his asset. However, this cost is offset by the benefit to the
spouse not covered by the pension plan. Congress' intent in enacting ERISA and the REA
was to protect the spouse least likely to be protected by the common law and least likely to
have outside assets-traditionally the nonemployed wife.
Under California's community property law, each spouse has an undivided one half
interest in each marital asset. Upon the death of either spouse, one-half of each asset belongs
to his or her estate and the other half belongs to the survivor. California, therefore, already
provides the protections that ERISA and REA attempts to guarantee. If California law is
preempted by ERISA, the banker's position at death does not change. One-half of the painter's
money and one-half of the balance of her pension pass to her estate. The painter is left with
one-half of his asset and the ERISA mandated spousal annuity of one-half of the pension.
The painter's position at his death, however, is very different. One-half of the asset he earned
belongs passes to his wife, but according to the Ablamis majority, none of his wife's pension
belongs to his estate. He, therefore, loses a property right over a marital asset and gains
nothing in return.
While ERISA was designed to protect the interests of spouses not covered by pensions,
it is ironic that its effect in community property states is to make the nonemployee spouse
considerably worse off. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1468-69 (stating that majority opinion creates
result opposite to Congress' intent by stripping away rights of people Congress wanted to
protect). The painter loses property rights over the pension for which he is deemed to have
provided one-half of the funds.
185. See Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d I11, 114 (Tex. 1988) (holding that pension funded
with community assets was community property, therefore, one-half passed to nonemployee
spouse's estate), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); supra note 34 (discussing presumption of
equal contribution of assets to acquisition of community property).
186. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (characterizing effect of
allowing Ms. Ablamis to devise interest in pension plans as injury to employee spouse).
187. Id. The Ablamis court speaks of Ms. Ablamis' devise divesting Mr. Ablamis of his
pension rights. Id. See also supra note 144 (identifying Ms. Ablamis' property interest during
her life). Under California law and under the QDRO exception, however, Ms. Ablamis does
have a community property interest in the plans. Id. Therefore, the question remains of how
Mr. Abiamis can be divested of something he does not possess.
188. See supra note 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing ownership of Ablamis'
pension plans while both spouses were alive).
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alive before it discarded California property law and Ms. Ablamis' property

rights.
Despite the holding in Ablamis, ERISA need not preempt state substantive property law. The determination and characterization of property
rights is an extremely important state function and Congress should not

involve itself in that function absent a compelling need. 8 9 Congress' regulation of pension plans clearly does not require such an involvement. ' 9 By
enacting ERISA, Congress intended to provide stability and uniformity to
pension plan management and guarantee benefits.' 9' State determination of
the ultimate ownership of benefits within the family unit does not injure
this intent. 92 California community property law does not adversely affect
Congress' goals of preserving funds for future distribution, providing uniform management rules, and safeguarding benefits from creditors. 93 Congress recognized the contribution made to the marriage by the nonemployee
spouse and designed the REA to compensate for that contribution. 94 Because
this recognition is central to California property law, it is ironic that by
adopting principles that provide common-law nonemployee spouses with
equitable interests, Congress has reduced the property rights of the nonemployee spouse in community property states. 95 Congress, therefore, should
amend ERISA's anti-alienation provision to recognize specifically community property states' choice to create the existence of the one-half interest
of each spouse in pension benefits earned by either spouse in community
property states. 196
189. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing policy of congressional
respect for state sovereignty and for state interest in its property law).
190. See supra note 11 (stating that Congress' purpose in enacting ERISA was to protect
beneficiaries by regulating management of pension plans).
191. Id.
192. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)
(stating that Congress designed ERISA to safeguard benefits for pensioners and dependents);
AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that Congress designed antialienation provision to protect employee from his own financial improvidence in dealing with
third parties and not to preclude benefit transfer between spouses); supra notes 100-03 and
accompanying text (noting in Ablamis dissent that application of state law results in no injury
to federal interests).
193. See supra note I1 (stating Congress' goals in enacting ERISA as listed in § 1001(b)).
In § 1001(b), Congress stated that the goals of ERISA are to protect beneficiaries by establishing
standards for plan management and administration. Id.
194. See S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2547, 2547 (describing goals of REA).
195. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (stating that California law allows
testamentary transfer of interest in pension plan). The REA increases the benefits and rights
of nonemployee spouses in common-law states, but eliminates the property right of nonemployee
spouses in community property states. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (citing preERISA cases recognizing nonemployee spouse's property right). Considering that the word
"equity" is in the title of the Act, this outcome is ironic. See John Hopwood et al., Selected
Current Issues in Community Property Aspects of Retirement Plans, 39 BAYLOR L. REv. 1199,
1228 n.194 (1987) (noting argument that equity requires both spouses to be treated alike under
REA provisions).
196. See ERISA, supra note 3, § 1056(d) (stating that qualified domestic relations order
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CONCLUSION

In a case where an unsympathetic party sought relief Justice Jackson
stated, "[w]e agree that this is a hard case, but we cannot agree that it
should be allowed to make bad law."' 97 This should be a lesson followed
by the Ablamis majority because its decision to take Ms. Ablamis' property
rights is the result of bad law. In Ablamis, the court seemed horrified by
the thought that an innocent husband would be stripped of his hard earned
pension by the adult children of his deceased wife. 9 If any property was
taken, it was Ms. Ablamis' property rights in the pension plans.'9 Because
the tone of theft so pervaded the majority opinion, the Ablamis court
would likely have decided the case differently if Ms. Ablamis' children had
been helpless infants or profoundly mentally disabled adults. 2°° Because the
beneficiaries were not at issue, the majority should not have allowed the
beneficiaries' identity to influence the property rights of the deceased Ms.
Ablamis. Justice Jackson's message is that judges make good law not
through sympathetic fact patterns, but rather by consistent application of
sound legal principles.
ERISA should not preempt California community property law to satisfy
the Ablamis court's view of equity in this particular case. 20' Ms. Ablamis'
estate should prevail in its fight for recognition of Ms. Ablamis' property
is exception to anti-alienation provision). Section 1056(d) states that:
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not
be assigned or alienated.
(2) ....
(3)(A) Paragraph (1) shall apply to the creation, assignment, or recognition of a
right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant pursuant to a domestic
relations order, except that paragraph (1) shall not apply if the order is determined
to be a qualified domestic relations order. Each pension plan shall provide for the
payment of benefits in accordance with the applicable requirements of any qualified
domestic relations order.
Id. Congress should amend this section specifically to allow any transfer in plan benefits
pursuant to state definitions of spousal ownership. My suggestion for an amendment is to
change paragraph (3)(A) to (3)(A)(i) and insert paragraph (3)(A)(ii) stating, "Paragraph (1)
shall not apply to the recognition of ownership rights in the pension plan as a result of State
property law." See supra note 176 (proposing alternate preemption provision to clarify status
of state property law).
197. FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229 (1946).
198. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
199. See supra notes 157-76 and accompanying text (discussing possibility that Ablamis
court's ruling results in taking of property in violation of Fifth Amendment).
200. See Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457 (claiming that Ms. Ablamis attempted transfer was
to "third parties" and that Ms. Ablamis sought to divest Mr. Ablamis' "family" of benefits);
id. at 1460 n.17 (claiming that transfer of benefits to Ms. Ablamis' family would frustrate a
general statutory purpose of preserving benefits for pension owner's family). The Ablamis
majority characterizes Ms. Ablamis' devise as a transfer to a stranger rather than to her
children and husband. Id. This allows the court to preserve the supposed goals of ERISA
while blocking any sympathy for either Ms. Ablamis or her family. The Ablamis court is not
heroically saving the benefits of a defenseless Mr. Ablamis.
201. See Hopwood, supra note 195, at 1215-16 (1987) (observing that community property
principles should not be preempted simply to suit perceived equities of particular case).
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right not because she had a sympathetic story, but because she had a

substantive legal right to the pension plans under California law and under
ERISA. Ablamis v. Roper is an important case for the citizens of community
property states. Barring Supreme Court review or congressional action, the
decision in Ablamis may become the final word on the ERISA preemption
issue because five out of nine community property states are within the

Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. 2 2 The Ablamis court, however, incorrectly

satisfied supposed congressional intent by sacrificing important state-granted

property rights. 20 3 For all citizeng of community property states, this is an
unjust result.
JuLIE ANNE BARto

202. Assuming the Ablamis court decision will stand, the question remains of what the
next person in Ms. Ablamis' position should do. The nonemployee spouse has a few options
to ensure property rights that may be devised. First, the spouses could divorce. This is an
unattractive option, but it would enable the property rights of the spouses to be adjudicated
consistent with state law. Second, the nonemployee spouse could waive all rights in the pension
in exchange for title to other assets. This solution depends upon the existence of other assets
of comparable value. Additionally, spouses must complete this transfer before death, because
the Supreme Court has held that compensating the nonemployee spouses estate subverts
Congress' intent of preservation of benefits for the employee spouse. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572, 588-89 (1979). Third, the nonemployee spouse could waive all rights in the
pension in exchange for the employee spouses enforceable promise to pay a portion of the
pension benefits to the people the nonemployee spouse desires to benefit. This solution takes
the pension benefits out of the realm of ERISA restrictions because the parties have made no
attempt to transfer the right to receive benefits directly from the plan, but the nonemployee
spouse must rely on the good faith compliance of the spouse or court intervention to guarantee
the contract. Any of these options permits the nonemployee spouse to devise the interest
recognized by California law.
203. See supra notes 191-95 and accompanying text (observing that application of California law does not harm federal interests).

